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This paper takes a critical look at the Francafrique, the relationship between France and
its former colonies. Using a dependency theory approach, it will explain why the Francafrique as
it stands today is not a partnership between equals but rather an unbalanced agreement that
mostly benefits France, multinational corporations, and the ruling elites of the countries it
operates in. This paper will show how dependency theory helps explain the way Francafrique
functions and how it impacts the economic growth of France’s former colonies, in order to prove
that as it stands, the relationship between France and Côte d’Ivoire is detrimental to the
economic autonomy and development of Côte d’Ivoire. This will be done within the historical,
political and economic contexts of the relationship between France and Cote d’Ivoire over the
course of three French and Ivorian presidencies (1995-2017).

Keywords
Cote d’Ivoire, France, France’s African policy, Francafrique, Dependency Theory

Terms:
BCEAO: Banque Centrale des Etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest [Central Bank of West African States]
CFA: Communauté Financière Africaine [African Financial Community]
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
Francafrique: term used to describe the unequal relationship between France and its former
colonies in West Africa
WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union

Introduction
The close relationship France maintains with its former colonies in West Africa has its
roots in the decolonization negotiations that took place in the 1960s and 1970s. Upon
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establishing their independence, former French West African colonies (with the exception of
Guinea Conakry) chose to keep close ties with France, in the hopes of avoiding conflict and
benefiting from a smoother transition to political and economic autonomy. For France,
maintaining relations with its former colonies meant keeping their influence over territories that
offered access to oil, raw commodities and untapped consumer markets. Despite his opposition
to colonial rule, former President Charles de Gaulle recognized the benefits that extensive ties
with Africa presented to France (Chafer, 2006). Under his presidency, he established an ‘Africa
cell’ at the Elysee Palace, a special department separate from the French Foreign ministry,
where advisors decided African political and economic policies. Among other agreements, the
former colonies agreed to keep the franc CFA (African Financial Community), a currency that
ties the countries’ monetary policies to France. Former Ivorian president Felix HouphouetBoigny first used the term ‘Francafrique’ to designate the idyllic image of cooperation and
mutually beneficial partnership that it was to embody. However, over the years, the term has
evolved to designate the neo-colonial character of those relations. The relationship between
France and Côte d’Ivoire 1 is particularly interesting because of the uniquely close ties between
Houphouet-Boigny and French officials, even after independence. Having experienced greater
economic growth than its counterparts in the 1970s and 1980s, Cote d’Ivoire has been hailed by
mainstream economists as the shining example of the amicable Francafrique model (Bovcon,
2013).
Because of the relative economic stability and growth that Côte d’Ivoire has experienced
since its independence, this paper will focus on its relationship with France, and analyze its
economic impact over the course of three French and Ivorian presidencies (1995-2017). First, I
will go over the history of Franco-Ivorian relations since the independence in 1960. I will then
explain France’s role in shaping the current political climate in Côte d’Ivoire, and how it affects

1

Côte d’Ivoire was formerly known as Ivory Coast, but the country officially changed its name in 1986.
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its economic growth. Finally, I will look at the monetary and financial agreement and its
implication for Cote d’Ivoire’s ability to control its economic policies.
Developmental theories: what factors drive economic development?
Economists have long pondered the issue of development—improvement of the social,
economic and political well-being of people—in the Global South. In the first half of the 20th
century, modernization theory was the model adopted by mainstream economists to explain the
process of development. In this context, modernization means the transition from a traditional or
‘pre-modern’ state to a modern one. Inspired by the work of German sociologist Max Weber,
who defined a modernized society as one whose values are based on rationality, bureaucratic
domination and world mastery (Marsh, 2014), modernization theory implies that countries’
development process is contingent on the evolution of their internal institutions from traditional
to modern ones. This theory is rooted in the empirical relationship between a country’s GDP per
capita and the nature of its internal institutions. In fact, proponents of modernization theory
found that (1) as a country’s level of modernization increases, certain aspects of its social,
political, cultural and economic institutions change, (2) there is a certain degree of homogeneity
among the institutions of countries that have successfully completed the process of
modernization. Thus, in order for developing countries to reach modernization, their internal
institutions must change (Marsh, 2014). Within the context of this research, it is important to
note that this theory is rooted in European colonial aspirations. In fact, developing nations are
constructed as having ‘traditional’ societies; without the resources to develop without the
guidance or domination of a Western country. Several other theoretical frameworks such as
post-colonialism and post-structuralism look at how the distorted representations of nonWestern countries have influenced international relations.
Based on these assumptions, several economists such as Walt Rostow (1960) have
proposed a concrete 5-stage process through which traditional societies (based on subsistence
agriculture) become modern ones (based on high consumption) by going through several steps
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in their economic model. This evolutionary outlook is built upon in more recent works by
Newson and Richerson (2009), who developed the ‘kin hypothesis’. According to this theory,
cultural aspects of societies also ascribe to the process of evolution from pre-modern to
modern. For Newson and Richerson (2009), economic development fundamentally changes the
priorities of individuals, who move their focus from kin related issues (marriage, family and
community) to non-kin (professional network, education, individual success).
Starting in the mid-20th century, modernization theory has faced many criticisms as
scholars point out its exclusive focus on the internal barriers to modernization that developing
countries face. While that may be a relevant arena of focus when studying the developmental
process of already modernized countries, the analysis of development in countries of the Global
South cannot be complete without considering the major external forces at play, including
former colonial powers. These external influences include foreign governments–which was not
uncommon, especially in the context of the Cold War–and multinational firms that sought to
control resources in developing countries. In light of these realities unique to the situation of
developing nations, studies on economic growth have evolved from modernization theory to
alternative approaches to development, one of which is dependency theory (Namkoong, 1999).
Dependency theory argues that, first, there needs to be an emphasis on internal and
external factors, as well as the relationship between the two. This means that the blame for the
failure of development policies should not fall solely on the shoulders of the political leaders of
the country, but also on the international forces that apply pressure for their own benefit as well.
That is especially true in developing countries where the influence of foreign interests is
considerable. Second, multinational actors, social classes and foreign states need to be
considered as additional units of analysis. Dependency theorists argue that in addition to the
state/market dichotomy that is mostly present in liberal analyses of economic policy actors,
multinational corporations, economic and political elites, and foreign states play a role in the
state of the economy through their various spheres of influence. In the Françafrique, for
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instance, the monetary union (CFA) that is backed and overseen by France is seen by
dependency theorists as a sign of external influence on countries’ economic policies. Lastly,
while proponents of modernization theory believe that today’s developing countries should
follow the same path as earlier developed countries, dependency theorists argue that the
conditions under which the latter underwent their developmental process are no longer existent
(Namkoong, 1999).
Another major difference to note between dependency and modernization theory is their
ideological base. Dependency theory views international relations from a structuralist
perspective. Structuralism has many overlaps with dependency theory. Scholars of this school
of thought (Prebisch, 1960; Singer, 1949; Furtado, 1964) look at the structural impediments to
development in developing countries and argue that state intervention and the implementation
of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) is the best way to modernization. Dependency
theory takes this a step further by considering the different factors and actors that stand in the
way of ISI and self-sustaining growth in developing countries. It upholds that there is an unequal
exchange between a core (earlier developed countries) and a periphery (developing countries),
while modernization theory grounds itself in a liberal perspective, which underlines a virtuous
triangle in which the diffusion of democracy, universal institutions and economic policies lead to
peace and prosperity for all nations. For dependency theorists, this viewpoint undermines the
unequal footing on which countries stand when negotiating economic and trade policies on the
international sphere. Not taking into account this reality means overlooking what is in their view
the main barrier for modernization in developing countries.
Dependency theory itself has evolved through different stages in which scholars
grappled with the complex relationship between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ countries. In dependency
theory, the ‘core’ refers to countries with developed and independent economies that often lead
in the international decision making process, whereas countries in the ‘periphery’ are mostly
reactionary to the formers’ policies and are dependent on them for political and economic
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growth. Early studies posit that one major aspect of dependency is the lack of control peripheral
countries have over their economy. Several factors explain this: first. peripheral countries often
depend on either agriculture/livestock production or the export of raw materials, both of which
are subject to forces out of their control—agriculture and livestock depend on natural conditions
and raw material exports depend on external demand—which often leads to high fluctuations in
market price. Second, the current trend of foreign direct investments in peripheral countries
mean that “an increasing portion of the ownership and control of national resources and
activities are turned over to foreign firms” (Namkoong, 1999, p.131) leaving peripheral countries
no room to develop their own industries. Finally, in the specific case of Francophone Africa,
countries have limited control over their monetary policies since they belong to a common
financial community (CFA) that controls their exchange rates as well as their reserves (Canac
and Garcia-Contreras, 2011). This lack of control limits countries like Côte d’Ivoire’s ability to
enact policies that would encourage diversification, as opposed to the unsustainable practice of
catering to external demand through the production of cash crops.
France and West Africa: interdependence or dependency?
In liberal thought, the idea of interdependence is a positive attribute of an international
economic and political system. Early liberals such as Immanuel Kant have discussed the merits
of states cooperating to create peace and security. From an economic perspective, David
Ricardo has demonstrated how states can benefit from each other through specialization in their
comparative advantages; all nations are better off economically when they specialize in the
production of the good they can most efficiently make and trade with other nations. The idea of
interdependence became more prominent after the establishment of the post-WWII international
economic and political system that prevails today. It emphasizes on the benefits of cooperation
between states as a way to create mutually assured peace and prosperity among nations.
International institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and the UN were created as oversight
agencies that would ensure economic, social and political stability in member states.
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In the case of developing nations, international institutions have repeatedly made the
case that the main impediment to their development was the ineffective protectionist policies put
in place by their governments. In fact, from a liberal perspective, the market automatically tends
towards ‘efficient’ outcomes, meaning that every resource is optimally allocated in order to serve
individual, national and international interests. If this assumption is held to be true, then
inefficient outcomes emanate from non-market influences, namely internal, political entities that
use the state to serve their own personal benefits. In the case of African economies, the
problem is often defined in terms of corrupt elites and ‘failed states’, or the incapacity of states
to let the market operate in an efficient way, without looking at the external pressures that
contribute to their economic and political problems. The solution proposed by these international
institutions consists of accepting Structural Adjustments Plans (SAPs) that would allow
international market forces to shape domestic prices, wages and resource allocation patterns
with little to no intervention by states (Bienefeld, 1983). However, SAPs have been criticized for
making developing countries more vulnerable by forcing states to diminish support for their
national production and open their borders to foreign supply and demand. As states cut their
social spending, their local agricultural and industrial sectors stop growing and they are forced
to rely on products from better established economic powers such as Europe, the United States
or China.
Thus, similar to modernization theory, this outlook fails to account for the various
international actors that support and have been supporting policies that are detrimental to the
developing countries’ growth over the years. First, the liberal perspective erroneously assumes
that the market outcomes are (1) always efficient and (2) simultaneously benefit both individual,
national and international interests. In contrast, dependency theory argues that unregulated and
open markets can be detrimental to emerging economies that do not always have the capacity
to compete at an international level. Without a minimum of protection from the states, infant
industries are quickly overwhelmed by outside competition and unable to develop. National
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economies are forced in the position of providing raw, export-oriented commodities while
importing necessities such as food (Bienefeld, 1988). For most of these countries, this is only a
continuation of the plantation colony model they were forced to adapt to during colonial times.
However, as commodity prices fall, so do their foreign reserves and their ability to import
products necessary for their populations, thus resulting in a widespread crisis. In addition,
dependency theory rejects the notion that the ‘efficiency’ of the markets provide the same
benefits for every actor involved, emphasizing instead that the interests of the states might differ
from those of individuals or even international actors.
In his study of African economies from a dependency theory lens, Bienefeld (1988)
argues that the SAPs recommended by the World Bank actually go against the benefit of
African countries because they prevent them from regulating their economies to prevent the
deterioration of their foreign reserves, social welfare programs and infrastructures. He argues
that even the most successful NIC (New Industrialized Countries) ‘miracle’ economies such as
Taiwan and South Korea were heavily involved in managing their growth through state-owned
financial institutions, discretionary credit subsidies and control of investments, tariffs and nontariff barriers (Bienefeld, 1998, p. 71). Dependency theory allows us to look beyond the
state/market dichotomy, beyond the assumption of an auto-regulating markets and makes us
consider different actors (state, non-state) and layers of analyses (national and foreign) that play
a role in shaping the economy of developing countries.
Despite the efforts of multiple French presidents to frame it as a mutually beneficial
partnership between equals (LeGouriellec, 2011), the relationship between France and Cote
d’Ivoire displays symptoms of dependency as opposed to interdependence. Dos Santos (1999),
a Brazilian political scientist, defined dependency as the situation in which periphery countries
find themselves in:
A situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development
and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of inter-
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dependency between two or more economies, and between these and world trade,
assumes the form of dependency when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand
and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only
as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on
their immediate development.

The following analysis will demonstrate that the dynamic between France and Cote d’Ivoire
show the same characteristics of one country being overly dependent on the other, both at the
political and economic levels. While there have been studies such as Bienefeld (1988), Canas &
Garcias (2011) that have done a cross-country analysis in Africa using a dependency theory
lens, there are virtually no country specific studies in Francophone West Africa that underline
the effects of a dependency relationship in practice. The case of Côte d’Ivoire is of particular
interest because, as one of the strongest economies in the CFA union, it has been heralded by
mainstream development theorists as proof that liberal policies and collaboration with France is
of positive impact on its former colonies. However, this paper argues and shows that despite its
relative economic stability, Côte d’Ivoire does exhibit traits of dependency in its relationship with
France, which prevents it from achieving economic independence and sustainable
development.
French Presence in Cote d’Ivoire: A Brief History
In order to truly understand the nature of the Francafrique, it is important to ground any
study on the matter in the historical, colonial roots of the French presence in West Africa. The
Francafrique is an evolution of the previous colonial rule to a more concealed, purportedly
mutually beneficial relationship.
The presence of France in Cote d’Ivoire dates back to the mid 19th century, a few years
before the Berlin Conference formally assigned African territories to different European powers.
Once they succeeded in crushing resistance from local tribes and kingdoms, the French
established a system of direct colonial rule by appointing regional governors and administrators
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in different protectorates. This enabled them to institute a head tax as well as a system of forced
labor that enabled them to profit off of the various raw commodities the country was able to
produce (Handloff, 1991). Through this system, French plantation owners benefited from free
labor and thus accumulated profits while the Ivorian population remained impoverished. In
order to sustain this dynamic and crush potential uprising, the French allowed the creation of an
elite, educated class of Ivoirians that were virtually allowed the same rules as French citizens
(Handloff, 1991).

Through the use of assimilation policies, officials enforced the concept of French
superiority over other institutions, laws and customs. Under assimilation, a different set of laws
governed French citizens (colonizers) and subjects (colonized). For subjects, the only way to
gain access to rights enjoyed by citizens was to gradually strip themselves from their native
culture, language and traditions. Through the use of a divide-and-rule strategy, the French only
allowed access to these rights to a minority of Ivoirians that were educated in the French
tradition. This small elite believed that, through Western education, they would be able to
achieve equality with their French peers and would eventually be granted independence, a hope
that quickly turned to disillusion after WWII (Handloff, 1991). Nevertheless, the notion that
France, as a more advanced economic and political power, would benefit Côte d’Ivoire’s
economy is still prevalent in older Ivoirian generations who grew up under French rule.
The aftermath of WWII brought about several factors that impacted popular sentiment
towards France in Côte d’Ivoire. First, the need to rebuilt a war-torn France led to the increase
of tariffs and administrative expropriation of labor, further upsetting the Ivoirian working class
(Lawler, 1990). Second, the accounts of returned Ivorian soldiers that were drafted in the war
introduced a loss of confidence in the power and security of the French state. Furthermore, the
introduction of profit crops and better agricultural practices after WWII led to the emergence of a
wealthy class of African farmers, competing with the well-established French crop farmers
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(Handloff, 1991). Increasingly aware of the unfair market rules that privileged European farmers,
local farmers created an African Agricultural Union (Syndicat Agricole Africain—SAA), led by
future president Felix Houphouet-Boigny. Later renamed the Democratic Party of Cote d’Ivoire
(PDCI) in 1946, the SAA began explicitly voicing its opposition to the French authorities and as
a result, was met with violent repression (Handloff, 1991). Realizing the fate that awaited the
party if it continued protesting French presence, Houphouet-Boigny decided to form an alliance
with the administration, thus successfully acquiring significant political and economic power as
chair of the PDCI.
France and Côte d’Ivoire: A Literature Review
The relationship between France and Cote d’Ivoire is peculiar in that, contrary to other
formerly French colonies such as Guinea or Algeria, the two have maintained close ties on
political and economic levels. In fact, the predominantly non-violent transition process from
colony to independent nations in most of West Africa have allowed for the formation of a strong
relationship even after colonial ties were severed (Chafer, 2006). When it comes to analyzing
this relationship, scholars of Franco-African relations disagree on the nature of the
consequences a continued relationship with France has had on West African economies.
Among some scholars, France’s prolonged presence in Francophone Africa has been
criticized as paternalistic and detrimental to the region’s autonomy. In her study of FrancoAfrican relations during former French President Sarkozy’s presidency, Legouriellec (2011)
provides an analysis of his public position on African affairs in contrast with concrete policy
changes during the same period. She finds that in his address to African nations, Sarkozy had
often promised the end of the hegemonic influence of France on African politics and economy,
but his efforts remained symbolic—such as abolishing the African unit of the presidential Elysee
Palace. In fact, his cabinet remained filled with officials intent on maintaining the status quo
relationship between the two until the end of his tenure (Legouriellec, 2011). Similarly, military
intervention remains an important facet of France’s presence in the region, which some scholars
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argue is a way of preserving its political influence in the region. Wyss (2013) argues that in
continuation of its ‘Francafrique’ agenda, France’s intervention in the 2010-2011 conflict in Cote
d’Ivoire was meant to reinstate its status as a hegemon by supporting then-presidential
candidate Allassane Ouattara, a strong France ally. France has been accused of being selective
in its interference, only using force wherever their political and economic influence seems to be
in jeopardy. In Cote d’Ivoire, its intervention during the 2010-2011 was motivated by the fact that
power was at the time in the hands of an outspoken anti-France leader, Laurent Gbagbo (Wyss,
2013). Wyss argues that to this day, France has successful used a hybrid policy strategy in
which they utilized both multilateral and unilateral interventions in West Africa, while at the same
time maintaining their international legitimacy in doing so. This is significant because in the eyes
of the international community, France has been intervening only to uphold international values
such as democracy and human rights and remains an impartial, benevolent actor in the region,
while the reality is more nuanced (Wyss, 2013).
From an economic perspective, Canac and Garcia-Contreras (2013) take a closer look
at the financial community (CFA) to which most of France’s former colonies belong. While
conceding that the CFA offers benefits to both France (access to low-cost raw materials and
growing consumer markets) and its former colonies (access to French treasury and stable
monetary policy), Canac and Garcia-Contreras point out that the CFA is mainly a way for
France to retain its hegemony in the region. This claim is supported by the fact that France has
also extended EPA agreements with resources rich non-CFA countries such as Nigeria and
Angola (Canac and Garcia-Contreras, 2013). This is detrimental to CFA nations because it
keeps them in a situation of dependency where they only have access to one potential
economic partner.
On the other hand, other scholars argue that the relationship between France and its
former colonies represents a win-win situation where France has access to resources and its
former colonies benefit from the political stability and developmental aid that derives from
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French presence in the region. For instance, Chafer’s (2006) research suggests that the neocolonial tendencies that have long characterized Franco-African relations are no longer existent,
as the primary relationship between the two countries has shifted from a political to an economic
one. In fact, for Chafer, the ‘Francafrique’ disappeared in the 1990s with the emergence of new
actors such as multinational corporations, because “the defining feature of this relationship was
that it was state centered” and characterized by “a dense web of personal ties and affinities”
(Chafer, 2006, p.11). In addition, Chafer argues that the generation of old school ‘Francafrique’
supporters are no longer present, whether in France or African nations. Instead, he claims the
newer generation of policy makers’ intentions are of promoting economic self-sufficiency and
democracy. However, Chafer’s analysis fails to take into account the fact that while French
policy in Africa has rebranded itself as a proponent of democracy and economic liberalism, the
old practices remain, further advanced by multinational corporations whose interest align with
France’s.
Felix Houphouet-Boigny and the legacy of Franco-Ivorian relations
The close relationship between Cote d’Ivoire’s first president, Felix Houphouet-Boigny,
and France has helped shape the nature of their dynamic today. While Houphouet-Boigny was
instrumental in changing discriminatory policies within the French colonial rule—such as making
sure that Ivorian upper class plantation owners were able to compete on the same terms as
European ones—he was opposed to full independence (Handloff, 1991). In fact, he supported
the idea of a semi-autonomous regional alliance presided over by France, similar to the one that
was created by then-president Charles de Gaulle after WWII. Under the 1956 reforms known as
loi de cadre, leaders of French colonies—of which Houphouet-Boigny was a member—were
allowed to take part of the decision making process with regards to their domestic policies
(Handloff, 1991). Houphouet-Boigny remained a supporter of French presence in Africa until
independence movements among other colonies (such as Senegal and Mali) grew stronger and
Cote d’Ivoire ended up following suit in 1960.
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Still, Houphouet-Boigny retained his ties with French officials and continue to promote
policies that were beneficial to France; in the 20 years following his rise to presidency, the
number of French immigrants working in Cote d’Ivoire nearly doubled, thanks to cultural and
technical cooperation accords that allowed for Cote d’Ivoire to benefit from French ‘savoir-faire’
(Handloff, 1991). As a result, most in the French community occupied civil servant jobs such as
political and economic advisors, teachers and managers. During his rule, Houphouet-Boigny
quickly became known as the poster child for Franco-African relations. In fact, Chafer (2006)
refers to his ties with French officials as ‘familial’, since they exhibited the following
characteristics: (1) meetings held between the two countries were “more like a family gathering
than an official summit meeting, as there is no published agenda and they issue no final
communique” (Chafer, 2006, p. 4), (2) successive French presidents insisted on the idea that
part of the colonial heritage was the creation of a ‘family’ linking France to its former colonies,
and placing it in the position of providing economic, political and economic support (Chafer,
2006) (3) finally, the community of French and African leaders formed was is called a réseau
(personal network) characterized by the interlinking of personal, state and party interests
(Chafer, 2006). This aspect of the relationship was more notorious as it allowed African leaders
such as Houphouet-Boigny himself to consolidate their power in their respective countries with
little accountability.
French African Policy throughout Three Presidencies
Over the years, French presidents themselves have strongly supported continued
presence in African affairs regardless of their party affiliations. This research’s scope includes
the tenure of three past French presidents, Jacques Chirac (1995-2007), Nicolas Sarkozy
(2007-2012) and Francois Hollande (2012-2017), all of whom have perpetuated the
Francafrique agenda despite publicly proclaiming different views. France has been facing
criticism from both international organizations such as the WTO for their preferential trade
relationships with West African countries, and from activists, both French and West African,
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denouncing France’s hegemonic policies in the region. in response to this, contemporary
presidents (especially since Chirac) have adopted a more subtle approach, at least in their
public discourse.
These three presidencies are significant because with Chirac’s rise to power in 1995 came a
new generation of French presidents that are, at least in theory, recognizing and condemning
the Françafrique model and the neocolonialist relationship it stands for. In practice however,
there has been little effective change, but rather a shift from consolidating France’s political
influence in the region to strengthening its economic relationship—and expand it to include
countries that weren’t its former colonies (such as Nigeria and Ghana). It is customary for every
French president to go on a tour of Francophone West Africa soon after their inauguration, to
set the agenda for their tenure’s ‘African policies’. By analyzing each of the three presidents
most significant speeches and comparing them to the actual changes in real life policies—at
least in Cote d’Ivoire, we will be able to assess whether there has been truly a change in
France’s attitude towards Africa.
After his inauguration in 1995, Jacques Chirac’s ‘African tour’ started with a visit to
Yamoussoukro, the Ivorian capital. In an address to French nationals residing in the country,
Chirac expressed his commitment to providing economic and political support to Cote d’Ivoire.
He started by denouncing what he calls “afro-pessimisme” (Chirac, 1995, p. 4), the prevalent
outlook that considers Africa endemically prone to conflicts, famine, and misery, as based not
on facts but an unwillingness to acknowledge what he sees as the significant economic, political
and social improvements African countries have made since their independence with the help of
international organizations.
“Aujourd'hui nous voyons dans la plupart des pays africains, et en particulier en
Afrique francophone, s'affirmer chaque jour davantage une gestion plus rigoureuse,
un accord plus fort entre les organisations internationales chargées de conseiller,
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d'aider ou d'orienter et, des gouvernements africains de plus en plus composés
d'hommes compétents et déterminés à sortir d'une certaine improvisation”
[Today we see in many African countries, especially Francophone Africa, better
management and better cooperation between different international organizations in
charge of advising, helping or guiding and African government that are increasingly
made up of competent men determined to stop improvising [their policies]]

Rather than acknowledging the history of colonization that has been a major impediment to
development on the continent, Chirac attributes economic struggles to the poor leadership of its
leaders. What’s more, he completely sets aside France’s role in that history and rather places
himself as Africa’s advocate against the pessimistic naysayers of the international community
“Moi, je suis de ceux qui croient en l'Afrique et qui ne pense pas que l'Afrique est marquée par
une sorte de fatalité (…) Il convient de se mobiliser contre cette tendance perverse et
dangereuse” [I am of those who believe in Africa and who do not think that Africa is struck by
some sort of fatality (…) it is imperative to stand up against this perverse and dangerous trend]
(Chirac, 1995, p.3). However, despite his promise for a change in the dynamic of Franco-African
relations, the first few years of Chirac’s presidency showed more of a continuity of the
Francafrique model. In fact, he later made the decision to support then Congolese President
Mobutu Sese Seko, long after his army’s crimes against humanity were denounced by the
international community (Chafer, 2006). In 1999 however, when Houphouet-Boigny’s confidant
and successor Konan Bédié was overthrown in a military coup, then Prime Minister Lionel
Jospin, a socialist, overrode the Chirac-backed push to intervene and put Bédié back in
power—interrupting a longstanding tradition of intervening to support pro-France African leaders
(Chafer, 2006).
Soon after his inauguration, Chirac’s successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, stated a willingness to
fundamentally change Franco-African relations for the better. In fact, even as Minister of Interior
in 2006, he called for “turning over a new leaf, leaving behind complacency, government
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agencies, secrecy and ambiguity” (Sarkozy, 2006). Despite being acclaimed for it by most of
African youth and critics of French neo-colonialism, his approach was of concern for long time
African leaders who had benefited from protection and support from France thus far
(LeGouriellec, 2011).
However, any hopes of significant changes were quickly dismantled when Sarkozy
delivered his first speech in an African country, in Dakar, Senegal. Riddled with patronizing
claims and factually incorrect remarks, Sarkozy’s infamous Dakar address triggered a wave of
anti-France sentiment across Francophone Africa. In fact, as LeGouriellec (2011, p.4) states, he
portrayed the African as naturally incapable of rationality and responsibility by declaring “Le
drame de l'Afrique, c'est que l'homme africain n'est pas assez entré dans l'histoire (…). Jamais
l'homme ne s'élance vers l'avenir (…). Dans cet univers où la nature commande tout (…) il n'y a
de place ni pour l'aventure humaine, ni pour l'idée de progrès” [the tragedy of Africa is that the
African man has never really entered History (...). He never leaps towards the future (…). In this
universe where Nature commands all (…), there is no room either for human adventure or for
the idea of progress] (Sarkozy, 2007). Instead of limiting France’s presence in Africa, Sarkozy
rather encouraged what he called a transition from Francafrique to Eurafrique (Sarkozy, 2007)
during which he encouraged other members of the European Union to engage with the
continent (LeGouriellec, 2011). While this is the first time this phenomenon was acknowledged
and supported by a French president, the integration of France of European Union had already,
in practice, provided for other members of the EU a gateway into West Africa. Since the late
1990s, the Netherlands and Germany in particular have emerged as top exporters of Ivoirian
cocoa beans and paste (OEC, 2017).
In response to Sarkozy’s speech in Dakar, scholars across Francophone Africa have
published a co-authored book, L’Afrique répond à Sarkozy: Contre le Discours de Dakar [Africa
responds to Sarkozy: Against the Dakar Speech] (2008), in which they heavily criticized
Sarkozy’s approach to Franco-African relations. They particularly warned against Sarkozy’s
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proposed policy solutions, which positioned France as Africa’s guide to development
(“codéveloppement”). In congruence with IMF and World Bank doctrines, Sarkozy encouraged
the use of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) between African and European countries,
which, as shown in the “Impact of French-Ivorian relationship on Ivorian economy” section of
this paper, do little to help African economies reach self-sustaining growth. In addition to this
policy of codéveloppement, Sarkozy criticizes what he calls the “collectivism and progressivism”
(Sarkozy, 2007) of African governments, specifically referring to protectionist and interventionist
policies that are mostly meant to provide social nets and protect local infant industries in African.
These recommendations of state non-intervention, also backed by the IMF and World Bank, are
largely seen by African economists as a way to assure little to no local competition to
multinationals that settle in the area (Gassama et al. 2008). Sarkozy’s harsh, neoliberal policies
contrast highly with his successor’s, François Hollande, who had a softer, less patronizing
approach to France’s Africa policy throughout his term.
Five years after Sarkozy’s infamous Dakar speech, François Hollande returned to
Dakar to address the Senegalese Assembly upon his inauguration in 2012. This time, President
Hollande was sure to be careful in his word choice regarding France and Africa’s relationship. In
fact, he proclaimed “Je ne suis pas venu ici, à Dakar pour montrer un exemple, pour imposer un
modèle, ni pour délivrer une leçon. Je considère les Africains comme des partenaires, comme
des amis.” [I did not come here, in Dakar, to give an example, to impose a model or teach a
leson. I consider Africans my partners, my friends.] (Hollande, 2012). As opposed to his
predecessor, who argued for less state interventions in African economies while at the same
time restricting the inflow of African products and people in France, Hollande insisted on a
reciprocity in the concessions the two regions made to each other. He adds “le temps de la
Françafrique est révolu” [the time of Françafrique is over] (Hollande, 2012). His speech
advocated for the transition of France from a hegemonic power to equal partner in Francophone
Africa. In his proposal, he expressed his willingness to give African countries more weight in
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economic and trade agreements and a more cooperative effort in political interventions
(Hollande, 2012). Francois Hollande’s “Africa policy” is, in many ways, a departure from Chirac’s
and Sarkozy’s in that it puts forth a less paternalistic role for France in the region. Nevertheless,
his tenure is still characterized by realpolitik; such as France’s controversial unilateral military
intervention in Mali, in 2013.
Throughout these three presidencies, a progressive decline of the Françafrique can be
observed, at least in theory. In practice, France did mostly refrain from unilateral militaristic
intervention in Francophone Africa, and instead has focused on expanding its economic
position. Regional agreements such as EPAs and groups such as the CFA alliance allow
France to maintain a strong foothold in the region’s economic structure.
CFA: A Unique Monetary & Trade Agreement
The CFA was first created in 1945 as a common monetary system for France’s African
colonies under the name Colonies Françaises d’Afrique [French Colonies of Africa]. It was
centered around three characteristics: a common foreign reserve system for all countries, a
monetary agreement based on a fixed exchange rate, and the free convertibility of all currencies
into each other at the fixed exchange rate (Canac & Garcia-Contreras, 2011). Under these
principles, the adhering countries (excluding France) agreed to keep 60 percent of their foreign
reserves at an Operations Account at the French treasury in Paris. Since their currency is
pegged (fixed) to the French franc (later the euro), any change in valuation would have to be
approved by French government and a unanimous vote of all members of the Banque Centrale
des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) (Canac & Garcia-Contreras, 2011). After gaining
their independence, most countries in West Africa decided to remain in this economic and
monetary union, which kept the ‘CFA’ acronym but under the name of Communauté Financière
Africaine [African Financial Community]. The aforementioned BCEAO was consequently
created in 1959 in order to issue the CFA franc from Dakar, Senegal. The other characteristics
of the union, including the peg to the French franc were maintained throughout the transition.
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The peg has caused several problems for countries such as Cote d’Ivoire who relied
upon income from exports to sustain their economies. In fact, when the price of raw
commodities fell in the 1980s, decreasing the amount of foreign currency coming to the country,
CFA countries struggled to keep enough foreign reserves in their economy to sustain the peg
and it was subsequently devaluated in 1994. The devaluation was followed by a period of
relative stability, because CFA countries were allowed to sustain the peg by borrowing an
unlimited amount of reserves from the Operations Account; and capital flows in and out the
region were regulated in order to prevent speculative attacks from investors.
At the same time, the economic and monetary union was renegotiated and repackaged
as the WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union). Under this new alliance, the
French Treasury would continue lending the West African Central Bank (located in Dakar,
Senegal) as many foreign reserves as needs to maintain the peg at its current value. In
exchange, the banks have to surrender their foreign reserves other than euros, and allow the
French government to appoint members of their board—who play a critical role in shaping the
monetary policies of all countries included in the union (Canac & Garcia-Contreras, 2011). The
main reason this practice continues to be sustained is the relative cost to the French treasury
and taxpayers, which never exceeded 2% of French GDP (Veyrune, 2007). In this paper, the
main concern is whether or not this arrangement is economically beneficial for Cote d’Ivoire.
Impact of French-Ivorian relationship on Ivorian economy
Cote d’Ivoire remains one of the strongest economies in the WAEMU, representing 33
percent of the region’s overall GDP (World Bank, 2009). One of the main reasons for Côte
d’Ivoire meteoric rise to top economy in West Africa is the substantial size of its raw material
exports—namely cocoa, rubber and sugar in the 1960s and 1970s. Coupled with then-President
Houphouët-Boigny’s strong ties with French officials and companies, this large influx of foreign
reserves helped Côte d’Ivoire build strong infrastructure and provide stable employments for a
few decades. However, like any other raw material export-oriented economy, it remains
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sensitive to international price fluctuations and foreign trade policies, as both factors carry a
disproportionate impact on its GDP (Canac & Garcia-Contreras, 2011). In the 1980s, the fall in
the price of commodities, followed by a sharp drop in export revenues, led to a significant
economic crisis, affecting small business owners and increasing unemployment in the country.
Today still, local businesses struggle to subsist in an economy where the focus has been
the export of raw materials instead of diversifying and strengthening the manufacturing sector.
In fact, its main exports remain cocoa products (53 percent of total exports in 2017), and rubber
(11 percent) (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2017). The BCEAO, which retains close ties
to France, has been maintaining conservative policies that makes it harder for small businesses
to borrow money and expand their share of the market (Mitter, 2015). Canac and GarciaContreras argue in their research that the relative cost of France maintaining its relationship with
its former West African colonies, especially Cote d’Ivoire is minimal when compared to the gains
it gets in return. Goods and services imported from France represent 16% of Côte d’Ivoire’s total
imports, making it a sizeable actor in the country’s economy (OEC, 2017). Of these goods, most
are packaged medications and food stuff such as wheat and wine.
Since most of Côte d’Ivoire’s agricultural sector is diverted towards cash crops that are
high in demand in the international community, foods that are for direct consumption are
exported from France and China (OEC, 2017). However, it is important to note that over the
years, France has lost its privileged status as a top importer in Ivory Coast. Today, most of Côte
d’Ivoire’s imports come from China (20 percent of total imports in 2017), although France is a
close second (17 percent of imports (OEC, 2017). Nonetheless, while the current globalization
trends allow for actors other than France to emerge in trade relations, the institutional link that
remains between France and Côte d’Ivoire explains why it is still relevant to study their
relationship.
In fact, bilateral agreements (EPAs) between Côte d’Ivoire and France have
perpetuated this situation of dependency. First, the previously mentioned push for cash crop
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exports instead of promoting food security adds to the precarious situation of African nations.
Second, these EPAs often include TRIPs or Trade-Related Intellectual Property rights, which
prevent African countries from accessing to technological knowledge held by other nations
(Canac and Garcia-Contreras, 2011). In recent years however, Côte d’Ivoire has taken steps to
encourage domestic manufacturing. Together with Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire produces 60% of the
world’s cocoa but virtually none of it is processed within its borders (Ochieng, 2017). The Ivorian
government is now trying to entice its local businesses to start producing chocolate, in hopes of
penetrating the European market with more competitive products that just raw materials.
Diversification of the economy, namely through the expansion of the manufacturing sector, is an
essential step for Côte d’Ivoire to achieve self-sustaining growth. While its economic growth has
averaged 8% in the last few years (Ochieng, 2017), the Ivorian economy is still prone to a crisis
if the global price of raw commodities were to substantially fall like they did in the 1980s.
Without the ability to control its monetary policy to transition out of an export-oriented economy,
long-term sustainable economic growth will be harder to achieve.
In their 2017 study, “Some Peculiarities of the Economic Growth in ECOWAS
Countries”, Ndiaye, Sarpe and Manga suggested that West African leaders should start
focusing on factors other than export value in order to fuel economic growth. They emphasized
on the importance of value added of agriculture, meaning the transformation of raw materials
into processed goods. In their analysis of West African economies, Ndiaye et al. came to the
conclusion countries could increase and stabilize their growth rates as well as create labor by
making sure that the raw materials they produce–cocoa beans for the case of Côte d’Ivoire–are
processed and turned into manufactured goods within their borders before being exported
(Ndiaye, 2017).
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Alternatives to the CFA? Local responses to French presence
It would be false to assume that West African scholars, leaders and activists have
remained passive throughout their tumultuous relationship with France. There has been ongoing
dialogue and calls to action both in and outside the continent from notable economists, writers
and activists such as Achille Mbembe of Cameroon or Nicolas Agboho of Côte d’Ivoire.
Since the mid-1990s, as the anti-globalization movement gained momentum across the
world, civil society organizations (CSOs) across West Africa have organized to protest the
Françafrique relationship. Originally a taboo in the African intellectual community, the issue of
the CFA is becoming more mainstream and widely addressed, especially since the counterglobalization protests that took place in Dakar, Senegal in 2012 (Sylla, 2016).
Prior to these more pronounced calls to actions however, West African leaders have
tried to remedy the lack of intraregional cooperation and Western economic dominance in the
trade arena. In 1975, both English and French speaking countries in West Africa convened in
Nigeria to sign the Treaty of Lagos, thus establishing the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS). By doing so, West African States were hoping to bridge the gap their
different colonial legacies created between them and boost intraregional trade and cooperation.
The ECOWAS has had limited success in reaching its goals of collective self-sufficiency and
growth for all its members. It remains one of the best performing regional blocs in Africa (in
2010, its growth rate of 6.7% was the highest among all 5 regional economic communities on
the continent) (Ndiaye, 2017). However, growth rates for each individual country remain highly
unstable and fluctuate throughout the years, mainly due to the nature of their economies.
Similar to Côte d’Ivoire, a majority of ECOWAS members depend on cash crop or other natural
resources exports to fuel their economic growth. In the event of changes in demand or
international prices, entire economies are threatened, a concern that has yet to be addressed by
institutional bodies such as the ECOWAS.
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In the face of the complacency of institutions, civil society activists and organizations
have mobilized to advocate for more radical changes in the nature of the relationship between
France and its former colonies. In January 2017, a group of African activists and economists
created Ugences Panafricanistes [SOS Pan-Africa], a grassroots organization rallying
movements across West Africa against the franc CFA and French hegemony.
Kemi Seba, a critical actor in the creation of Urgences Panafricansistes, has organized
anti-CFA demonstrations in several countries including Côte d’Ivoire and France. His most
recent intervention, an anti-CFA conference in Yopougon, Côte d’Ivoire, was set to take place
right after the spring meeting of the finance ministers of the BCEAO in March 2019. The
conference was to address the continuation of the anti-CFA struggle and was an explicit front to
Ivorian President Allassane Ouattara, who has often been criticized for his complacence in the
Françafrique. However, Seba was arrested a few hours prior to his conference and was
deported back to his home country, Benin (Jeune Afrique, 2019). Today still, URPANAF
continues its mobilization efforts across several countries in West Africa and in France by
raising awareness and inciting action against what they see as a continuation of colonization.
Conclusion
The answer to whether or not France’s relationship with Cote d’Ivoire (and, to a larger
extent, its other former colonies) is beneficial remains debated among economists and
politicians alike. For France, it seems obvious that the cost of maintaining a strong presence in
West Africa is minimal compared to the virtually unrestricted access to natural resources and
markets it obtains. For Cote d’Ivoire, the relationship with France meant a relative
macroeconomic stability and access to trade partnerships with other European countries, all of
which has helped it in its economic growth.
However, a closer look at the trade and monetary agreements between the two parties
shows that, in accordance to Dos Santos’ definition of dependency, Cote d’Ivoire’s growth is not
self-sustaining but rather contingent on and limited by French policies. In this situation of
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dependency, one country (France) benefits greatly while the other (Cote d’Ivoire) remains
undeveloped (Canac & Garcia-Contreras, 2011). The current relationship prevents Cote d’Ivoire
from diversifying its economy, a step that would allow it to exert more autonomy in its domestic
affairs. In order to achieve this state of self-determination, Cote d’Ivoire must be able to
diversify its sources of foreign investment and foreign trading partners and expand its industrial
sector. With the recent emergence of China as a competitive economic power and a main
source of import in Africa, it is crucial for Côte d’Ivoire to learn from its experience with France
and prevent its economy from becoming economically dependent on China in the coming years.
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